Firms that practice open innovation strategies rely on the cooperation of external firms to provide components, complements and customers for the innovations of the focal firm (Chesbrough, 2003). Such strategies can be quite complex in systems-based industries, which inherently require coordinating across a wide range of partners to deliver customer value (West, 2006) .
INTRODUCTION
Certain classes of complex products are created through the integration of a range of components and technologies. Producing such products in an open innovation context depends on contributions from across a network of suppliers of components and complements that create value for the eventual buyer. For a brand new product -or one that must be kept up to date by incorporating an ongoing stream of technological advances -this coordinated innovation by network members requires leadership of the network to deliver the systems product and its complements (Prencipe et al, 2003; Maula et al, 2006; West, 2006) .
One such complex product is a mobile phone, of which more than 1 billion are sold each year (Zeman, 2008) . Compared to a less popular (but more often studied) systems productthe personal computer -the mobile phone has a wider range of component suppliers and a more complex distribution system.
Here we study the open innovation network organised around a specific category of mobile phones, those incorporating the Symbian operating system, which accounted for twothirds of the 115 million advanced mobile phones sold in 2007 (Canalys, 2008) . Starting from Symbian's founding in 1998, we map the dynamic nature of Symbian's "ecosystem" management strategy across three distinct phases over its first decade.
In particular, we demonstrate how Symbian governed its ecosystem not through absolute market power, but through access to non-public information and contractual restrictions on the use of its intellectual property. We show how Symbian developed an emergent ecosystem management strategy, in which its formal ecosystem program represented a lagging indicator of Symbian's changing conception of how value was created in the ecosystem.
After review of prior research on networks in innovation, we provide a brief summary of Symbian's structure and context, and then use that to trace the evolution of Symbian's formal ecosystem strategy through three distinct phases. From this we make suggestions for contributions to theories of ecosystem governance and future research.
MANAGING OPEN INNOVATION NETWORKS
Our study builds upon prior research on value networks, ecosystems and their role in open innovation strategies. Here we use them to develop research questions about the creation and evolution of such networks.
The term "value chain" has been used to refer to the business relationships along a path from the supplier of raw materials through intermediate producers to the ultimate end-users (Porter, 1985: 33-39) . However, many products increase in value through the provision of complementary products, and these complementary products are often supplied to users by third parties outside the value chain (Teece, 1986) . Such complements are particularly important with information technology platforms, where standardized interfaces are defined and disseminated to encourage the production of complements (Gawer & Henderson, 2007) .
When such complementary products are considered in combination with the value chain the resulting relationships are often termed a "value network" (e.g. Amit and Zott, 2001) or an "ecosystem" (Iansiti and Levien, 2004) . 1 Such networks have been recognised as an important part of open innovation cooperation in certain industries (e.g., Chesbrough, 2003: 68; Maula et al, 2006; Vanhaverbeke and Cloodt, 2006) . The efficiency and effectiveness of cooperation between network member firms is often facilitated through the use of information technologies (Dodgson et al, 2006) .
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Here we use the two terms interchangeably, but favour "ecosystem" in the explanation because it is the one used by the subjects of our study.
The practice of what today is called ecosystem management predates formal academic theory on the subject, particularly in computer systems. From the birth of the mainframe application software business with IBM's 1969 unbundling decision 2 through the sale of retail packaged software such as Visicalc for personal computers a decade later, system vendors have increasingly recognised the importance of third party-complements for the success of their products (Campbell-Kelly, 2003) . Beginning in 1983, Apple Computer even created a new job category called "evangelist" to attract new ecosystem member companies and to coordinate interactions with the ecosystem sponsor (Kawasaki, 1990) .
Prior research has emphasised the importance that certain firms play in leading or guiding such a business ecosystem. An ecosystem typically contains a high rate of interdependency among member firms, and the member firms normally benefit from any value-creating member of the ecosystem (Iansiti and Levien, 2004) . Such cooperation may depend on the provision of well defined interfaces or other technical standards that facilitate coordination and cooperation between member companies (Johnson, 2003) .
Among ecosystem member firms, certain firms are well-situated to play a crucial role in linking members of the ecosystem and catalyzing links between other members. As such, these firms are often best situated to capture a disproportionate share of benefits created by the ecosystem (Normann and Ramirez, 1993; Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Maula et al, 2006 
RESEARCH DESIGN
Our study uses a case study research design, which is widely accepted as a way to understand and explain complex interorganisational relationships to develop theoretical insights (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989 ).
Here we study the ecosystem of Symbian Ltd., a privately held London-based developer of a mobile phone operating system for advanced mobile phones that it termed "smartphones." Unlike the vertically-integrated strategies used for the earliest mobile phone production, Symbian's business model of selling its software to a wide range of manufacturers anchored it explicitly within the open innovation paradigm.
We compiled data regarding changes in the company's ecosystem from a wide range of primary and secondary sources. Primary data from Symbian includes current information on its website, archived press releases dating to 1998 that are still published on the website, and previous information from the company website stored on the Internet Archive (Archive.org).
We have also referenced unpublished company memos and presentations, particularly around the evolution of the company's formal ecosystem program during each of its phases. We conducted interviews with current and former Symbian employees who managed aspects of its ecosystem strategy spanning the entire period 1998-2008. 3 We were also guided by participant observation by one of the authors, who was directly involved in the second phase of the ecosystem program.
Finally, we have been able to supplement our data with secondary data on the company and its ecosystem. We drew upon news coverage, particularly in The Register, a UK-based IT journal; and summaries of the company's history and strategy in books by Symbian authors (e.g. Tasker, 2000; Wood, 2005; Northam, 2006) . Symbian created an ecosystem strategy even before it shipped its first product, a strategy that evolved across three distinct phases in its first decade. Without Microsoft's market share and control of key applications, Symbian has less potential to impose monopoly power. In fact, the management of the Symbian ecosystem is constrained by the complexities of complements, systems architecture, distribution and ownership relations not present in better known computing architectures.
SYMBIAN LTD. AND ITS STRUCTURE

PDA Heritage
Symbian Ltd. was founded as a spinoff of another London-based company, Psion PLC, but was co-owned and funded by the world's largest handset makers (see Table 1 for key dates). (PDA), which also included Japan's Sharp Zaurus (launched in 1993), and from the US, the Palm Pilot (1996) and various "Handheld PC's" based on Microsoft's Windows CE (1996) (1997) The history of Symbian and its relationship to Psion can be found in Tasker (2000) and Northam (2006) .
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Here we focus on the pocket-sized PDAs that eventually proved to the be dominant design for the product category, rather the unsuccessful, tablet-sized PDAs such as the Apple Newton (1992-1997) and AT&T EO (1993 EO ( -1994 Symbian had designed its operating system to make it easy to change the user interface "look and feel" to allow its customers to offer distinctive products. It planned to develop a family of user interfaces for its OS, but over time its European customers migrated to two interfaces: Series 60, developed internally by Nokia for its own Symbian-enabled phones, and UIQ, a user interface originally developed by Symbian but which (as of late 2007) was owned equally by Sony Ericsson and Motorola. In Japan, the largest mobile phone carrier NTT DoCoMo owned a third user interface, MOAP-S, which provided a common user interface for Symbian OS phones sold to DoCoMo customers (Yoshizawa et al, 2006) . By the end of 2007, smartphones had grown to about 10% of all handsets sold worldwide; the remaining 90% of the phones sold were divided between "feature phones" and "entry level phones." Symbian OS was estimated to account for 65% of all smartphones -well ahead of Windows (12%), the Research in Motion Blackberry series (11%), Apple's iPhone (6.5%) and Linux (5%). Nokia alone held about 53% of the global smartphone market, or about 80% of all handsets utilising the Symbian OS (Canalys, 2008) .
SYMBIAN'S EVOLVING ECOSYSTEM STRATEGY
When Symbian began life in 1998, it had an established technology base for mobile devices, a team of experienced engineers and managers, and support from the three largest handset makers. At the same time, it faced a number of crucial challenge of building an ecosystem that would support its technological innovation.
It entered a new category of devices known variously as PDA phones or smartphones.
Despite its inheritance from Psion, it was a new firm that eventually needed a new ecosystem.
For both reasons, its managers did not know what sort of ecosystem would be required: like its competitors, it assumed that smartphone ecosystems would be similar to those for PDAs.
As its technology grew more popular, it attracted a growing number of potential ecosystem members, each wanting attention to solve their particular problems. At the same time, it was a small and (for the first seven years) money-losing company with limited resources. Thus, a crucial challenge was prioritising its scarce resources to build an ecosystem of unknown characteristics.
Finally, it faced two immediate competitors in Microsoft and Palm, at least three major future competitors largely unknown in 1998 -as well as many indirect competitors (i.e., the in-house software capabilities of its potential customers). Thus, as with most software companies, the intellectual property of its software copyrights and trade secrets were its major assets and it worried about leakage of that IP to existing or potential competitors (cf. Cusumano, 2004) . As it turns out, these IP concerns coloured (and, in fact, hindered) its willingness to transfer knowledge to ecosystem members, and thus its ability to attract new members and to help them create value.
Symbian's Ecosystem: Overview
Symbian OS was only available to phone users pre-installed in a newly purchased Symbian-enabled phone. This meant that unlike a PC, Symbian could not sell end-user software upgrades and had effectively no direct relationship with customers. 6 Instead, adoption of its latest technology depended on new adoption of smartphones and replacement purchases by existing owners.
Symbian uses the term "ecosystem" 7 to refer to its network of customers and complementors (e.g. Northam, 2006) . Different categories of licenses and partner relationships exist; the major categories include:
• System integrators or "licensees" (phone manufacturers) that integrate externally sourced and internally developed hardware and software to create new devices (i.e.
handsets) for sale to end users.
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• CPU vendors work to make sure that Symbian OS is compatible with their latest processors.
• Other hardware suppliers provide drivers for their respective hardware components.
• User Interface companies. Only the Swedish UIQ Technology AB comprised a separate company, but Symbian user interface development groups existed within both Nokia and NTT DoCoMo.
• Other software developers, sometimes referred to as independent software vendors (ISVs). This included developers of user applications and also middleware components such as databases.
• Consultancies and training centers. Symbian provided licensees a list of certified contract software development companies it called Symbian Competence Centers, 6 As a consequence of its indirect business model, Symbian (unlike Microsoft or Apple) focused its branding efforts on system integrators and made little effort to increase public awareness of the Symbian operating system.
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The word "community" was sometimes used as an alternative, but "ecosystem" was generally preferred since "ecosystem" recognizes the reality that companies have competitive relationships as well as the "friendly" relations implied by the word "community". • Operators, which in most countries are the dominant distribution channel for phones, and also determine what software components are preloaded on phones.
• Enterprise software developers, for cases where a company developed Symbiancompatible software for its employees that use Symbian phones.
In many cases, members of Symbian's ecosystem were also members of competing 
Phase 1: An ad hoc Ecosystem Strategy
The initial structure and conception of the Symbian ecosystem was heavily influenced by its PDA forebears, and prior to that, the well-known exemplars of PC and other computer ecosystems. • "OCK" is the OEM Customisation Kit, containing Symbian OS and tools;
• "SDK" is the Software Development Kit used by ISVs to create applications and other add-on software.
However, the company soon realised that other potential ecosystem members needed their own specialised support. Over the next few years, Symbian's actual ecosystem and the pattern of ecosystem coordination evolved beyond the original Psion-inspired model (as illustrated by Figure 4 ). In particular, the actual ecosystems relations differed from the earlier conception (shown in Figure 3 ) in two key ways:
• Many partners were supplying software to phone manufacturers, but needed a greater amount of technical information and software than was contained in the SDKs designed for ISVs;
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The state of the partner program in early 2000 can be found on the Internet Archive (Archive.org) using the March 6, 2000 backup of www.symbian.com/partners.
• These same partners (termed "Licensee suppliers") needed two-way exchange of software with phone manufacturers, in ways that neither the OCK nor the SDK had envisioned or provided for.
Although Symbian had serious and well-managed programs to manage both phone manufacturers and ISVs from 1998-2002, in retrospect it underemphasized helping those companies that supported the phone manufacturers in creating devices.
Phase 2: Symbian Platinum Partners
Around July 2001 a proposal was created to unify many aspects of the previously separate partnering programs, into a new "Platinum Partner" program. The main differences from the ad-hoc programs that preceded it were:
• A deliberate preference for firms providing technology supplied in devices, rather than software added on afterwards. The "device creation" related partners included not only phone manufacturers (e.g., Nokia), but providers of hardware components (e.g. Texas Instruments and Intel) and those that provided bundled middleware (e.g. Sun and Real Networks) or development tools (e.g. Borland and Metrowerks).
• A desire to rationalise the efforts of running lots of different partner programs, and to obtain benefits of scale through having common development kits, event management, billing systems, and communications systems.
A key aspect of the new program was a new package of software provided to technology suppliers, known as the Development Kit ("DevKit"). This contained considerably more software than in the SDKs provided for ISVs, as well as additional licensing rights, but stopped short of the software and rights available to phone manufacturers. In parallel with the creation of the DevKit, the software package previously known as the OCK was redesigned as the "CustKit" -short for Customisation Kit.
The program was discussed internally for nine months, before being announced in April 2002 (Symbian 2002) . Reasons for the delay before launching the program included:
• Internal discussions over the appropriate membership fee for the program.
Initially, annual fees of $15-25k were proposed. After some time, the concept emerged of a lower rate ($5k) for program membership, coupled with a surcharge if a partner wished to license the DevKit;
• A change in Symbian CEOs, when its first CEO, Colly Myers, resigned in • "Licensee suppliers" were renamed as "partners," and the emphasis on supporting them increased because of their important role in helping create new phones;
• Previously ad hoc support mechanisms from Symbian to different partners were re-organised around the existence of the new DevKit;
• Previously ad hoc exchange of information and software between partners and licensees became governed by contractual terms in the new DevKit License (DKL);
• Symbian put less priority on direct support of ISVs, on the assumption that the task of supporting applications developers would shift to the phone makers and Even as the program grew in size, Symbian management felt constant conflict between "quantity" and "quality":
• The "quality" approach involved a preference for the larger companies that seemed most likely to become winners in the Symbian space, or which had special endorsements from Symbian's customers.
• The "quantity" approach followed the principle of "level playing field" -avoiding picking winners, but giving an equal opportunity to small and unknown companies; the idea was that even though a given company might have the best technology of its type at one moment in time, this should not become a reason to imagine that company would remain indefinitely as the leader in its space.
Efforts to provide a "level playing field" came at a cost: the resources required to administer a larger program -keeping track of contacts, preparing and chasing invoices, providing technical support, and running larger partner events.
Other difficulties in running a large partner program were already anticipated at the time For these reasons, a prioritisation scheme was viewed as inevitable, and partners (including potential partners) were internally allocated to different tiers of importance: AA, A, B, and C. The AA partners were 15 companies deemed most critical to Symbian's success, A-level were 50 companies of high significance, the B level were those with at least one internal champion, and the C level comprised the remainder (Wood 2003) .
Finally, ecosystem members differed significantly in their rights to use Symbian's IP:
phone manufacturers had less restriction than partners. Phone manufacturers received all source code to Symbian OS 13 whereas partners did not receive so-called "Category A" source code that was deemed to be particularly confidential or sensitive. Based on an assumed "huband-spokes" model, partners were only allowed to distribute their changes to selected Symbian OS software to phone manufacturers (at the "hub") rather to another partner. As time passed, it became clear to Symbian management that both of these restrictions hindered the free flow of valuable information and innovation among the ecosystem; both restrictions were eventually removed.
Overall, Symbian maintained an ongoing effort to benchmark the Platinum program:
almost every year between 2004 and 2007 there was one (or more) internal review project to seek significant improvements in the partnering programs -involving internal managers and/or external consultants. These projects usually started optimistically -people would say things like "It should be easy to stop wasting effort on the low-value partner engagements and to put more effort onto the high-value partner engagements". But as the review projects progressed, the optimism changed to an acceptance that all the easy optimisations of the program had already been made, and that partnering activity which initially looked low-value was often highly valued by important Symbian stakeholders (key customers, internal strategists, and so on).
Phase 3: Symbian Partner Network
In November 2007, Symbian began developing a new partner program to meet two key objectives:
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Apart from a very small portion that had been licensed in by Symbian from third party suppliers under a contract preventing any other company from seeing the source.
• Increase the efficiency of the program operation through the enhanced use of IT, including increased web-based automation of common activities and creation of an improved extranet (called "SDN++") to communicate with ecosystem members;
• Utilise that increased efficiency to lower the price and broaden the reach of the program, particularly with independent software vendors.
The most visible change in the program was a reduction in the annual fee from $5,000 to $1,500. Part of the cost savings came by eliminating assigned partner managers for each registered partner, with ecosystem members instead supported using extranet-based standard information and (paid) technical support. Symbian also lowered its expectations to a breakeven basis; the Platinum program (conceived at a time when Symbian was losing money)
eventually generated a net profit. system had been shipped in 200 million phones, the most in the industry (Symbian 2008b ).
However, both from inside and outside the company, a contrary argument can be made for several crucial decisions.
Most difficult was the relative priority of application software developers. As part of the Psion PDA (and PC) legacy, Symbian was created with an implicit assumption that the major focus of ecosystem management was working with such independent software vendors. Related to this was the crucial distinction between preinstalled and user-installed application software. The former proved essential for differentiating the off-the-shelf capabilities of smartphones from feature phones, while the latter proved to have much smaller demand than initially expected.
Some of the shifts in strategies (in response to unforeseen difficulties) are understandable in the context of the information available to Symbian managers at the time that decisions were made.
First, the assumption that the smartphone ecosystem would be like Psion's PDA ecosystem was fundamentally flawed. The ecosystem turned out to be more complex, and more heterogeneous, than originally assumed. This complexity came in part from the special difficulties in creating high-performance software than runs on comparatively low-powered hardware that is sold in large quantities. It also followed from the separation between the provider of the operating system (Symbian) and the providers of the UI layers (e.g. S60 and UIQ). A final source of complexity was the high amount of control (particularly over preinstalled software) exerted by handset makers and network operators, as when operators required restrictions on application software capabilities to reduce the risk of viruses.
Secondly, the process of creating new phones proved significantly harder than was originally expected. Wood (2005) identifies a number of potential pitfalls of mobile phone production, including changes in operating system (or UI) APIs across new releases, problems with third party software reliability and integration, and contractual delays in obtaining rights to distribute such software.
A third factor was that resources for the ecosystem management were limited and had to be self-supporting -particularly until Symbian earned its first profit in 2005. Thus, the partner program was limited to provided services to those partners willing to pay enough money to support the cost of providing those services. These restrictions were gradually reduced through IT-enabled efficiencies, including shifting from paper to "click through" agreements and distributing information via an extranet rather than CD-ROM.
However, Symbian had ongoing debates over the balancing between competing goals such as quantity vs. quality, fairness vs. focus, and personal attention vs. economies of scale.
Furthermore, partners often wanted to see as much operating system code as possible -and to have rights to redistribute their modifications (such as those necessary to support their own applications). Against this desire, Symbian had to weigh its desire to maintain trade secrets in the source code and to enforce the restrictions of its software suppliers.
DISCUSSION
Our study identifies three inherent difficulties for firms leading an open innovation ecosystem: knowing the ecosystem requirements for a product that has yet to be created, prioritising the conflicting needs of heterogeneous ecosystem participants, and balancing the interests of those participants against those of the ecosystem leader.
Cognitive Origins of Ecosystem Strategy
Prior research on ecosystem strategies has presented stylised explanations of how focal firms can control and manage their ecosystem to best advantage (e.g. Iansiti & Levien, 2004; Maula et al, 2006) . While this may be a desirable and perhaps even feasible steady state goal, our data suggests that finding the path to that state is far from trivial -both due to the complexity of the task and the information sufficiency facing the ecosystem leader.
At best, optimising the performance of an ecosystem built around some complex assembled product requires aligning the interests of a heterogeneous population of ecosystem members and partitioning (or self-assigning) the technical and business responsibilities among those members. Any actor has the choice to participate or not in the ecosystem; for many industries, this choice is influenced by the decision of whether to participate (nonexclusively) in one or more competing ecosystems. Finally, the actual (or prospective) failure of any ecosystem member may cause it to withdraw from an ecosystem, leaving a gap that is may be filled only after a considerable delay.
To this complexity, we add the inherent uncertainties (and unknowability) that come with a new ecosystem around the firm's new platform. These uncertainties will be greater for a new firm, without prior firm-level reputation products or ecosystem experience. They will be even worse for a new-to-the-world technology or product category, where there is no direct precedent (known to any party) for partitioning the business and technical responsibilities across ecosystem partners. A firm without products or an ecosystem will have to make assumptions about what technologies and business relationships it will need to create value.
As Alan Roderick, onetime head of the Symbian Platinum Partners summarized it: "In the early days, nobody knew where smartphones were going to go, what they were going to be capable of, or what it would take to make them sell."
To use the Mintzberg (1978) formulation, any ecosystem strategy has its intentional and emergent aspects. We suggest that the intended strategy is manifest by the firm's efforts in activities, structures and programs to create and nurture an ecosystem, while the emergent strategy arises from those firms that choose to join the ecosystem (or not), pressures from competing ecosystems and broader changes in demand, technology and market structure.
If a firm enters a market without an existing ecosystem, then where does this ecosystem and the firm's initial ecosystem strategy come from? Our data -and the industry standard practice that influenced our subjects -suggests two possible cognitive heuristics that shape ecosystem formation.
First, the firm (or its managers) will build upon the firm's (or their individual) prior ecosystem experience. Symbian was created by spinning off a Psion business unit, so it is not surprising that the ecosystem strategy were inherited from its parent, as were many the relationships with software developers. IBM's reputation and relationships in mainframes and minicomputers carried over to its personal computer, just as Apple used both its structure and many of its developers from its Macintosh ecosystem to launch one for the iPhone.
Secondly, lacking a large body of formal knowledge on ecosystem management, firms adapt strategies from similar ecosystems. This might be the ecosystem of a direct competitor, or by analogy to other industries that appear to have similar relationships with suppliers, customers and complementors. It is here that the PC ecosystem (particularly the Windows ecosystem) has been extremely influential -whether because of the success of the Windows (perhaps independent of its ecosystem strategy) or because it's a highly visible model that is widely known among IT producers and users alike. Another category of ecosystem -with considerably more variation and experimentation -is that of videogame consoles. However, perhaps due to its unique business model (with royalty payments by complementors to console makers) it does not appear to have been widely copied in other industries.
Consistent with Prahalad & Bettis (1986) , these inherited heuristics form the dominant ecosystem logic for a firm or even an entire industry. However, both of these simplifying heuristics of experience and exemplars will eventually fall short. Over time, Symbian (like Microsoft) found that the ecosystem required for an advanced mobile phone is different than that for a PDA, with less importance for familiar actors and new actors of crucial importance.
Firms depend on feedback from both the ecosystem and also their own market success to fine tune their strategies, but (as with any complex strategy) causal ambiguity makes it difficult to impute the success or failure of a strategy to any one decision (cf. Reed & Defillipi, 1990) .
Inherent Tradeoffs in Ecosystem Relationships
While potential members of an ecosystem may see the choices of ecosystem design as a fait accompli, as a practical matter every ecosystem sponsor faces a series of trade-offs in managing ecosystem relationships. These trade-offs are illuminated by the internal perspective of our study and the access we had to the subject company.
A new firm or business unit will face practical limits of staff and other resources that prevent it from taking all possible actions to increase the value created by the ecosystem. If the ecosystem has a direct competitor (or substitute), it will also face pressures to create as much value as quickly as possible. The pressure to win early adoption and a supply of complements are particularly acute in in the face of network effects that lead to a winner-takeall outcome (cf. Arthur, 1996; Shapiro & Varian, 1999) .
The tradeoffs must be made under conditions of limited resources, time and knowledge of the future include:
Breadth vs. depth. For the same amount of time and money, a sponsor can engage deeply with a small number of important partners -maximising their chance of success -or reach broadly (but superficially) to make sure that no potentially important partner goes unaddressed.
Prioritisation and tiering. As a practical matter, a heterogeneous distribution of partner importance will mean an unequal division of attention; in fact, most programs seem to adopt two-to-four levels of importance (sometimes with the distinction of the top level of attention not publicly disclosed). But within these tiers are questions of how many partners belong in each category, how much resources belong in each, and the differences in costs and benefits between these categories. Again, the risk of neglecting a partner known to be important must be weighed against missing an unknown one.
Scale. A large program is unlikely to provide the personal attention of a small one; at the same time, certain activities that reach a large audience (such as producing standardised documentation or an online partner infrastructure) require economies of scale to implement.
Customisation vs. standardisation. Programs that are flexible to the need of individual partner are the most effective but least efficient; scale both makes standardisation possibleas with the effort necessary to create a software development kit -and, in effect, makes it an imperative for supporting all but the most elite partners.
A final reality of ecosystem design is winning the loyalty and attention of partners that are members of multiple competing ecosystems. This is a long-standing issue in the videogame consoles, where the availability of key games (such as sports games from Electronic Arts) are believed essential to the successful launch of a new console. In the mobile phone arena, these divided loyalties apply not only to software developers, but also component manufacturers, system integrators (i.e., handset makers) and operators.
Conflicts of Control vs. Complement Supply
Our study focuses on a particular subclass of ecosystem: that organised to provide complements that increase the value of a specific technology platform (cf. Bresnahan & Greenstein, 1999) . Prior research has emphasised that the third party provision of complements for such systems depends on a technical modularity that enables partitioning of the task between firms (Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Steinmueller, 2003) .
However, the mere existence of technical modularity does not mean that it will be possible (or practical) for such complements to be produced: exploiting that modularity requires a combination of codified and tacit knowledge. For electronic components, potentially codified knowledge will include pin specifications and timing diagrams; for software or web services, it will be application programming interfaces.
That information is not costless to codify: in the case of Symbian, the company consistently struggled to allocate sufficient resources to work on software development kits.
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A short-term expedient is the person-to-person transfer of knowledge from the creator to the complementor on an ad hoc basis, a less expensive option for a small number of complementors but prohibitively expensive for a large number.
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Even if the information is codified, the sponsor faces a difficult choice of how widely to distribute the information and under what intellectual property restrictions. As with other information goods, such information can be costlessly and exactly replicated (Shapiro & Varian, 1999) . That information can be quite valuable to potential or existing competitors, whether in providing insights into the trade secrets behind the system implementation or in allowing emulation and access to the platform's complements (as when Linux became a lowcost imitation Unix that supplanted the original).
However, the platform owner cannot anticipate all possible complements that independent third parties might produce, and -even if it is aware of all complements -accurately 16 Partners and ISVs frequently complained that Symbian's technical documentation and developer tools compared poorly to that available from Microsoft. Despite a series of "documentation catch-up" projects to improve both the quantity and quality of tools and documentation, the criticism continued.
anticipate their prospective value to the platform. Restricting the flow of information to potential complementors will delay their production of complements, reduce the resources available for enhancing value, and (at the extreme) can either cause them to fail or discourage them from trying. This concern was articulated by multiple informants from Symbian who were involved in ecosystem management across all three phases.
The problem of controlling information versus enabling complements is part of a broader range of control trade-offs faced by platform owners. In open source software, control must be traded off against adoption, and also against participation in the process of producing that software (West, 2003; West & O'Mahony, 2008) . Here we extend this general trade-off of control vs. participation to the production of complements.
Future Research
There are inherent limitations as to the generalisability from a single case (in this case, a business ecosystem). The Symbian ecosystem is somewhat different from that for Windows
Mobile, and significantly different from other mobile phone and computing ecosystems.
Ecosystem relationships are considerably simpler in an industry where there is only one major class of complement such as with videogames, an industry where the degree of variation between firms and successive console generations cries out for a systematic study of ecosystem management.
In the tradition of Baldwin and Clark (2000) and others, this work suggests further research as to the interdependence of the technical and economical relationships within an ecosystem. The Symbian ecosystem suggests that the technical structure is more enduring than the business structure. A piece of add-on software may initially be created as a 
